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Abstract: Nowadays there is a general call, of every international institution, meaning EU, and other 
international mechanism requiring and basing their policies on the principle of conditionality (Pippan, 
2004) by urging states to undertake steps to fulfill the whole range of political and economic 
conditions in return for partnership, membership or monetary aid. Conditionality is screened through 
the new lenses of order and stability based on rule of law, democracy, free market economy, and 
respect for human rights and minority rights, envisaged as Western values. (Copenhagen Criteria, 
1993) To achieve this aim the rule of law is considered as occupying a unique position in a 
democratic society, therefore it is called upon states to create conditions for reforms on a judiciary as 
the traditional mechanism to decide on disputes, to protect citizens from the arbitrary political 
affiliation or private individuals. As such, it fights corruption too. (Un Judge) Simply said it is 
required from the states to create conditions to achieve the independent judiciary, through which 
democratic society can be created. As such, these analyses give hints on the issue of rule of law from 
the transitional phase of UNMIK to Kosovar Institution elucidating the presence of the EU EULEX 
Mission, too. Therefore, in the case of Kosovo the challenge of the judiciary system was twofold 
concerning UNMIK and EU Mission and the establishment of the Kosovo Constitution from another 
side. 
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1. Introduction 
Kosovo was administered territory through international organization UNMIK, 
(1999-2008) until Kosovo has reached Independence on 2008. In the early phase 
UNMIK it has de facto recognized politically as a state-like entity. (Brandt, 2005). 
In such environment the political system in Kosovo has been based on the rule of 
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law only to a limited extend. Rule of Law requires that laws are implemented by 
the executive power, that any executive action is based on the law, it requires the 
availability of effective remedies against acts of the executive and overall the 
transparency. (Raz, 1979) To achieve this aim every democratic society is based on 
the hierarchy of normative acts. Hierarchy implies that a legal act has its basis in 
the constitution, which provides structure of the government and at the same time 
limits the government action. Furthermore, Constitutional Courts are typically 
established outside the framework of the rest of the judicial system. In this early 
phase the promulgation of the Regulation 2001/9 known as Constitutional 
Framework for Self Governance of Kosovo (Constitutional Framework) UNMIK 
has established Kosovar Provisional Institutions for Self Government which is 
consisted of Assembly, President of Kosovo, Government, Courts, and other bodies 
of central and local level. Even though the Constitutional Framework sets out 
broad competences and responsibilities of the PISG still it reserves expressly the 
UNMIK and SRSG authority through Chapter 8 and 12 under which the SRSG and 
UNMIK have the authority to override every decision of the Kosovar elected 
institutions. (Report of the Secretary General, 1999) 
In the case of UNMIK, the Resolution 1244 has granted all legislative and 
executive powers in the SRSG that is heading the interim civil administration, 
including the administration of the judiciary. (Nilson, 2004) This robust mandate 
has shown also to lack central features of a democratic system with functioning 
separation of powers and checks and balances. This mandate did not guarantee also 
the accountability of administration when alleged human rights violations occur. 
On the other hand with the promulgation of the Constitutional Framework it was 
anticipated that the Provisional Institutions of Self Governance, in their activity 
must promote and fully respect the rule of law, human rights and freedoms, 
democratic principles and reconciliation. (Constitutional Framework, ch2b) 
However the Constitutional Framework did not provide for an individual 
complains procedure to review legislative acts of the local administration at the 
Supreme Court as the precondition for the independent judiciary. Therefore, “an 
individual alleging a human rights violation resulting from a piece of legislation 
does not have an effective judicial remedy”. (Salamun, 2000) While, the concept of 
rule of law aims to protect citizens from arbitrary state actions and human rights 
violations. (Brogan v. UK 1988; Amuur v. France 1996) 
Resolution 1244 envisaged the transitional phase and devolution of power to the 
people of the territory, however there was no clear vision of what will be the 
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organizational function of the territory, while at the same time the status and the 
talks were based on the policy of “standards before the status” (UN DOC 2003) 
This policy was justified as the precondition for a just and fair society, as required 
for the potential integration of Kosovo into European structures. (Commission 
Communication, 2014) The rationale behind this policy was to formulate indicators 
of good governance, to use as tools to measure progress in policies. Make local 
institutions fulfilling certain steps of progress from the intermediate phase to the 
discussion of final status. Standards intended to build democratic institutions, 
protect minority rights and human rights. Indicators of achievement would cover a 
range of issues in the political and economic sphere, public finance and taxation, 
human rights, public health, educational advancement, rule of law. (Knoll, 2005) 
Rule of Law as such was reflected in Standard 2.Due to the linkage of the standards 
and the status in many respects standards becomes “technical and marginalized” 
due to undefined status of Kosovo. As such, issue of rule of law has undergone 
transitional phase from UNMIK to the “Independent Republic of Kosovo” 
(Declaration of Independence, 2008) with its peculiarities. In this respect, the paper 
questions the assumption that the rule of law has reached the result based on the 
European and international law standards enshrined in our Constitution. 
 
2. Judiciary Reform under UNMIK 
Judiciary reform is considered as key element to combat crime and political 
violence, while weak justice system undermines the effort to establish stable 
governing institutions. (Cerone & Baldwin, 2004) Having in mind this circle, 
International Community has increasingly recognized the importance of judiciary 
reform programs in post conflict reconstruction in Balkans. Judiciary reform 
became priority even to UNMIK administration. (Betts, 2001; Stahn, 2007) From 
June 1999 UNMIK’s primary task was revival of the Kosovo judiciary. 
At the time of UNMIK deployment, the judicial system was literally non-existent, 
carried out within a relatively short time, has certainly represented one of the most 
remarkable achievements of UNMIK. Courts of all instances were restored in all 
centers of Kosovo. Subsequently, courts of minor offences were established in the 
municipal level including the High Minor Offences Courts as an appellate court for 
minor offences cases. Commercial Court, competent to adjudicate disputes 
involving business enterprises, also became functional. (Stahn, 2008) Reform 
programs were concentrated mostly as to identify and address weaknesses of 
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justice institutions through training and technical assistance, and international 
judge and prosecutors are brought when local judges or prosecutors are unable or 
unwilling to handle sensitive cases. (Carolan, 2008) As of October 2004, the 
judiciary employed 313 judges, including 14 judges serving on the Supreme Court. 
To ensure independent judiciary UNMIK has promulgated Regulation 1999/7 
based on this Regulation it was established the Advisory Judicial Commission 
(AJC). This body was competent to recommend candidates for judicial and 
prosecutorial appointment. The SRSG (Special Representative to the Secretary 
General) did not renew the AJC mandate due to the incapacity of this Commission 
to explicitly deprive judges and prosecutors to disband membership and political 
activities, and to initiate and disciplinary investigations during 1999 and 2000. 
(Inglis & Marshall, 2003) 
In April 2001 it was promulgated Regulation 2001/8 establishing the Kosovo 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, (UNMIK Regulation 2001/8, 2001) composed 
of nine members, the majority of whom were internationals. The KJPC thus 
envisaged a clear policy of International control over the judiciary. 
In securing the judicial independence UNMIK has appointed local and prosecutors 
with the three months contract, which gave ton UNMIK a degree of control over 
them and possibility to intervene when independence could be at stake. To this 
effect, UNMIK has appointed international judges to district courts throughout 
Kosovo and to the Supreme Court, to handle sensitive cases as war crimes or inter-
ethnic or political violence. While on the other hand there was no appeal 
mechanism in place to complain against international judge’s professional or 
ethical misconduct. (OSCE reports; Lawyers Committee for HR, 1999)  
Although UNMIK has been able to intervene and protect judicial independence to a 
certain limits from the politics, judicial independence remained under the absolute 
control of UNMIK without a possibility to be challenged by the local ownership. 
The UNMIK achievements were not sufficient to assert conclusively that Kosovo 
judiciary has become “independent, impartial, multi-ethnic and competent”, due to 
the nature of UNMIK itself.  
 
3. EU Standards and the Rule of Law 
Membership in European Union is a clear aspiration of leaders across SEE Central 
and Eastern Europe, and consequently for Kosovo too. As envisaged, EU has set up 
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the principle of conditionality for accession in EU, known as: “Copenhagen 
Criteria” of 1993. One of the main criteria’s for EU accession is the stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities. (Hillgruber, 1998) 
In the accession process of the Western Balkans countries strengthening the rule of 
law has proved to be an uneasy task and “identified as continuing major challenge 
and a crucial condition”. (Enlargement Strategy 2011-2012) The Commission notes 
in the EU’s Enlargement Strategy that the accession process depends on 
demonstrating results in the application of the rule of law and at the same time it 
was agreed that “strengthening the rule of law and democratic governance is 
central to the enlargement process”. (Baun, 2000) 
In principle, justice system so far, with the integration processes in the EU did not 
resulted with the creation of a uniformity, by creating a united model of a justice 
system for every EU member, therefore national justice system remained with the 
specific features of organization. (Toggenburg & Grimheden, 2016) EU members 
accepted that each state has the right to organize its own judicial system in the 
manner it consider most appropriate. The aim behind this policy of EU is to protect 
rights granted to individuals and legal persons (and rights recognized by the EU 
law) in practical and effective manner despite the forms of how justice system is 
organized. (Rollo & Mayhew 2006). At the same time, the ongoing reforms of the 
Western Balkans countries in the area of rule of law and judiciary reform have 
been primarily driven by EU assistance. (Larsen, 2014) For a decade now, the EU 
through the assistance provided by the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and stability programme-CARDS and as of 2007 through the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) supports the rule of law and 
judiciary reform. In particular, as mentioned by the Commission, the current IPA 
regulation has proved to be efficient and effective and the proposal for the new 
financial instrument will draw from this experience. (Enlargement Strategy, 2011-
12) As a result of EU assistance and as noted through the Country Progress 
Reports, there is a general perception that (with noted exceptions) the legal and 
institutional framework in the judiciary is mainly in place. Enlargement process in 
Kosovo were initiated with UNMIK and continued with the government of Kosovo 
after gaining the Independence. The biggest achievement is the signing of the SAA 
(Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Union and 
Kosovo on 22 October 2015).  
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4. Status of Kosovo - Independence 
Independence of Kosovo is achieved on 17 February 2008 after more than six years 
of international administration by UNMIK in Kosovo, the international community 
agreed to open the issue of the future political status of Kosovo. In essence, the 
Contact Group, an informal grouping of six countries (USA, Russia, United 
Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy) in the second part of 2005, agreed to open 
the issue of the future political status of Kosovo. 
On14 of November 2005 the UN Secretary General appointed Marti Ahtisari as the 
Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations for the process 
regarding Kosovo’s future status (UNOSEK, 2007a), Status talks began in Vienna 
on 20.02.2006 between the PISG and Serb authorities. Despite several rounds of 
talks and conciliatory efforts made by Ahtissari, Prishtina and Belgrade were not 
able to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s political status. In view of this deadlock, 
on 26.03.2007, Ahtisaari submitted the “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement”, which proposed internationally supervised independence for 
Kosovo with extensive protection mechanisms primarily for Kosovo Serb 
Community. Efforts to have the proposal endorsed by the UN Security 
Council failed in July 2007 as a result of indications that Russia and China 
would veto the proposal if voted upon in the Security Council. While the 
proposal was accepted by Prishtina it was declined by Belgarde. A last effort to 
reach a consensual solution was made with the appointment of a Troika 
consisting of representatives of the United States (US), the European Union 
(EU) and Russia, which, however, on 10.12.2007 reported that their efforts 
had ended in failure. Finally, on 17.2.2008, supported by the US and most 
EU states, Kosovo declared independence with the Constitution of the 
Republic of Kosovo entering into force on 15.6.2008. As of mid-January 
2010, 65 states have recognized the Republic of Kosovo and it has become a 
member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. 
However up today five European countries Cyprus, Spain, Romania and Slovakia 
and Greece did not recognize Kosovo Independence yet. (Weller, 2008) 
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5. EULEX Mission and the Rule of Law 
Additionally, Ahtisari’s proposal covered the structure of the future international 
presence in Kosovo, including here the ESDP mission (EULEX) in the field of the 
rule of law. European Council of Foreign Ministers rushed through the joint action 
establishing EULEX before Kosovo’s declaration of independence, thus at time 
when at least no EU member would object to the establishment of EULEX. (Dzihic 
& Kramer, 2009) A legalization of EULEX Mission occurred with the acceptance 
of Russia and Serbia for the price of the EU Member States accepting EULEX 
participating as part of the UN presence in Kosovo. However from a Kosovo 
perspective EULEX operates lawfully only if it is based on any of the documents 
listed by Kosovo as being legally constitutive for EULEX’s mandate. The Joint 
Action establishing EULEX makes no reference to the Ahtisaari Plan, the 
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, the Declaration of Independence or an 
invitation by Kosovo authorities.  
Its mission statement was as follows: 
EULEX KOSOVO shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law 
enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability 
and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice 
system and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions 
are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognized 
standards and European best practices (Council of the EU, 2008b) 
EULEX is also responsible to monitor, mentor and advise Kosovo institutions 
in all areas to rule of law and to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate and enforce 
certain categories of serious crimes. (Council Joint Action 2008). At the same time 
EULEX is also responsible for ensuring the maintenance and promotion of the rule 
of law, public order and security, which could include the reversion of annulment 
of operational decisions taken by Kosovo authorities. (Council Joint Action, note 
55). 
 
6. EULEX and the Judiciary 
On 13.03.2008 the Assembly of Kosovo adopted the Law on the Jurisdiction, Case 
Selection and case Allocation of EULEX Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo. The 
purpose of this Law is to regulate the integration and jurisdiction of EULEX 
Judges exercise certain judicial functions including the investigation, prosecution 
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and adjudication of criminal and civil cases listed in the law. (Law no. 03/L-053) 
EULEX judges exercise their jurisdiction either alone or in panels composed of 
EULEX and Kosovo judges and they operate within the structures of Kosovo 
courts. (Law no. 03/L-053.)  
Looking at the success of the EULEX Mission, according to the public 
perceptions it seems that it has failed. EU has published an independent 
report on its rule of law mission in Kosovo, EULEX. It concerns a scandal 
which erupted last year, when an official of the mission publicly accused it 
of having covered up a case of judicial corruption within its ranks. 
EULEX’s poor performance and grave mistakes, in particular, confirmed 
the untouchable status of the criminal segments of Kosovo’s elite, and, 
thereby, indirectly assisted them in strengthening their control over the 
country. (EU observer) On the other hand in the “Freedom House Report” 
Kosovo earned the rating “Semi Consolidated Authoritarian Regime”, while 
Gabriele Meucci, EULEX Head of Mission reacted on the ranking 
considering that “Kosovo Deserves Better” (www.eulex-kosovo.eu) 
There are also other scholars that considers that corruption remains 
“omnipresent” in Kosovo, adding that, while Eulex could not have been 
expected to root it out completely “it should, nevertheless, have been 
possible to lay the foundations of a system capable of fighting corruption”. 
(EU Observer; Jacque, 2015) 
 
7. Kosovo Constitution and the Rule of Law 
Besides the International presence Kosovo has promulgated its Constitution. The 
constitution was ratified on 9 April and came to effect on 15 June 2008. The 
Constitution was drafted through cooperation of USA-AID (as the main donor), 
Venice Commission, and a group of national experts. As such this Constitution 
became a model for attaining the highest standards of human rights.  
The Constitution provides that the courts must adjudicate based on the Constitution 
and the Law. (Const. of the Republic of Kosovo) The Constitution therefore does 
not allow for a EULEX judge, who is supposed to be integrated in the judicial 
system of the Republic of Kosovo, to decline the application of a law adopted by 
the Assembly of the republic of Kosovo or to seek legal clarification from a body 
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other than the Kosovo Constitutional Court. (ibid, Art. 102.3). Also, the 
Constitution of Kosovo makes clear division between the regular courts and the 
Constitutional Court envisaging that the Constitutional Court is not part of the 
judiciary, but entirely separate from it and from any other power. As such, the 
Constitutional Court as an independent organ of the Constitution, has the duty to 
protect constitutionality and make final interpretations of the Constitution. (ibid, 
Art. 102-107) 
 
8. Human Rights as a Prerequisite for Enforcement of the Rule of Law 
One of the novelties of the Kosovo Constitution is Art.53 which stipulates that 
“[h]uman rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed […]shall be interpreted in 
consistence with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights”.(ibid, Art. 
53). This Provision created the possibility for Kosovo citizens to address issues of 
human rights on the Constitutional Court and also through this provision European 
Convention of Human Rights directly become part of the national law of Kosovo. 
Therefore, decisions which derive from the ECtHR are binding interpretative 
guidelines, not only for all courts in Kosovo, but also other state organs, and assist 
them as to how fundamental rights and freedoms must be interpreted and applied in 
Kosovo. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Building the Statehood of Kosovo was rather peculiar and with it rule of law 
had the same destiny. In its inception UNMIK played the important role on 
reviving the judiciary, albeit with lots of critics on the concentration of 
power in the hands of SRSG. On the other hand the European Rule of Law 
(EULEX) mission is meant to serve a noble and important purpose, i.e. to 
assist Kosovo’s authorities in establishing and developing rule of law. 
However, it is impossible for EULEX to accomplish its mandate under 
circumstance in which it was established, under the status neutral 
framework of the Resolution 1244 while at the same time co-operating de 
facto in justice and other legal matters with the authorities of the Republic 
of Kosovo. On the other hand, the establishment and performance of the 
constitutional courts certainly contributed to building the Rule of Law 
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through judicial review within the political system. The justices and their 
rulings, in former communist countries and in Kosovo too, promoted the 
institutionalization of a political pattern, which relies on a constitutionally 
resolved conflicts. Therefore, one can conclude that from the very beginning 
the Constitutional Court has demonstrated that the bases of the decision are 
based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights with the 
desire to improve the bases of the Rule of Law as a determinant for 
developing democracy.    
 
10. References 
Amuur v France (1996). Judgment ECHR Reports and Judgment and Decision paragraph 50. 
Azzopardi, Godwin Muscat (2006). UN International Judge, Supreme Court of Kosovo. 
Parliamentary and Expert Roundtable on Constitutional Issues. 21 June Skopje. 
Baun, J. Micheal. (2000). A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. Oxford. 
Betts, W.S. (2000). The Post Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the Lessons-
Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law. Michigan Journal of International Law, 
vol. 22, pp. 371. 
Brandt, Marcus (2005). Effective Human Rights Protection when the UN Becomes the State: lessons 
from UNMIK. UN, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Situations Eds. by White Nigel D. & Klassen, 
Dirk Manchester Press, pp. 354. 
Brogan v UK. (1988). Judgment ECHR Reports of Judgment and Decision paragraph 66,67. 
Carolan, R.F. (2008). An Examination of the Role of Hybrid International Tribunals in Prosecuting 
War Crimes and Developing Independent Domestic Court Systems: The Case of Kosovo. 
Transitional Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 17, pp. 9. 
Cerone, J. & Baldwin, C. (2004). Explaining and Evaluating the UNMIK Court System. 
Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia Eds by C.P.R. 
Romano: Oxford University Press. 
Commission Communication (2014). A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law COM 
2014 158 final/2, pp. 7. 
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 102.3. 
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 102-107 (Justice System). 
Copenhagen European Council Summit (1993). There were enunciated full criteria for membership: 
political criteria; economic criteria and acquis communautaire. 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                      Vol. 13, no. 1/2017 
 
 58 
Council Joint Action (note 55), Art. 3 (b). 
Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, Art. 3 (a) and (d). 
Council of the European Union (2008e). Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on UN 
reconfiguration of the civilian presence in Kosovo. Brussels, 21 Jun e 2008,S223/08. Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ue Docs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/declarations/101371.pdf. 
Declaration of the Republic of Kosovo (2008) 17 February. 
Directive 743/2002 on general rules for encouraging cooperation in the area of home and justice 
affairs. 
Dzihic V. & Kramer H. (2009). Kosovo After Independence-Is the EU’s EULEX Mission Delivering 
on its Promises. Frierich-Ebert Stiftung. 
Edinburgh School of Research Paper no 2014/48 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2527627. 
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges (2011-2012). Brussels: European Commission, 4 and 23.  
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges (2011-2012). Brussels: European Commission, 20-21. 
Hillgruber, Christian (1998). The admission of New States to the International Community European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, 3, pp. 500. 
http://www.ico-kos.org. 
https://euobserver.com/opinion/128343. 
https://euobserver.com/opinion/128343. 
Inglis, Shelly & Marshall, David (2003). The Disempowerment of Human Rights –Based Justice in 
the United Nation Mission in Kosovo. Harvard Human Rights, Vol. 17, pp. 95.  
Jacque, J.P. (2015). Review of the EULEX Kosovo Mission’s Implementation of the Mandate with a 
Particular Focus on the Handling of Recent Allegations, accessed eeas.europa.eu/statements-
eeas/docs/150331-jacque-report-en.pdf>, visited 3 October 2016. 
Jonas, Nilson (2004). UNMIK and the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo: Human Rights 
Protection in a UN Surrogate State. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 22, No. 3.  
Knoll, Bernard (2005). From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and the Problem of an 
International Administration’s: Open Ended Mandate EJIL, Vol. 16, no 4, pp. 641. 
Larsen, Lars Bay (2014). Mutual Recognition in the Field of Criminal Law-A Short-Cut with 
Obstacles? 
Law No.03/L-053 on the Jurisdiction, Case Selection and Case Allocation of EULEX Judges and 
Prosecutors in Kosovo, Art.1, available at http://www.assembly-kosova.org. 
Law No.03/L-053(note 95), Art. 2. 
Letter dated 26.3.2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council 
(S/2007/168), available at http://www.unosek.org; Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement dated 26.3.2007, available at http://www.unosek.org.  
JURIDICA 
 
 59 
OSCE reports recommendation that international judges should be subject of the same conditions and 
the accountability as the national judges; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1999). A fragile 
Peace: Threats to Justice in Kosovo, New York, p. 1.  
Pippan, Christian (2004). The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU’s Stabilization and Association 
Process for the Western Balkans and the Principle of the Conditionality. European Foreign Affairs 
Review, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 220. 
Raz, J. (1979). The Rule of Law and its Virtue. In Raz. J, The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and 
Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 221. 
Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council of 12 June 1999, UN Doc, 1999/779, 
paragraph 39 and 41. Resolution 1244 empowers the SRSG to change, repeal or suspend the existing 
laws and to issue legislative acts in the forms of regulation. 
Rollo and Mayhew (2006). Political Economy of Enlargement. Lectures Sussex European Institute-
University of Sussex, Brighton. 
Salamun, Michaela (2000). Constitutional Preconditions for Good Governance and Sustainable 
Development in Kosovo. NASH Albanian Studies Program, Vol. 1, pp. 9. 
Stahn, C. (2005). Justice under Transitional Administration: Contours and Critique of a Paradigm. 
Huston Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, pp. 1. 
Stahn, C. (2008). The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: From Versailles 
to Iraq and Beyond. Cambridge University Press.  
Standards for Kosovo (2003). U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. 
UNMIK/PR/1078.  
Toggenburg, G.N. & Grimheden, J. (2016). The Rule of Law and the Rule of Fundamental Rights: 
Seven Practical Pointers. Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Eds. by Closa C. 
and Kochenov, D. Cambridge University Press. 
UNMIK Regulation 2001/8, 2001. 
UNMIK/Reg/1999/7 (1999). (On Appointment and Removal from Offices of Judges and 
Prosecutors), 7 September, amended by UNMIK/Reg/2000/57 (2000) 6 October. 
UNOSEK (2007a). Special Envoy for Kosovo. Available at http://www.unosek.org/en/speenvoy.html. 
Weller, M (2008). Kosovo’s Final Status. J. Int’l Aff. 84.  
www.eulex-kosovo.eu?page=2,10,298. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
